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Abstract 
 
Employing a unique retroactive application in regulation, we examine investors’ and managers’ 
reactions to a shock that introduces “à la carte” elements to the post-IPO mandatory framework. 
Relative to “prix fixe” mandates, à la carte elements shift the tradeoff between compliance costs 
and investor protection from regulators to the regulated firm, which enables local optimization. 
Upon the enactment of the JOBS Act, retro-activated emerging growth companies (EGCs) report 
higher short-window returns than the control group. Retro-activated EGCs’ return is lower when 
sales and sales growth rate are higher, both of which indicate a shorter expected duration of EGC 
status. Furthermore, managers act in investors’ interests and for their own benefit while using the 
à la carte elements in post-IPO years. The evidence suggests that investors perceive the benefits 
from local optimization associated with à la carte elements exceed potential costs from 
managerial opportunism and the loss of information and commitment.  
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I. Introduction 
This study examines the cross-sectional variation in both investors’ and managers’ 
responses to a structural change in regulation that provides voluntary choices within the 
mandatory framework for the secondary market. Answers to the research question shed light on 
the long-standing debate between voluntary disclosure and the need for mandatory disclosure 
(e.g., Jensen and Meckling [1976], Ross [1977], Coffee [1984], Easterbrook and Fischel [1984]). 
We choose to analyze regulation pertaining to the secondary market because Coffee [1984] 
suggests that the theory of voluntary disclosure (which renders mandatory disclosure 
superfluous) seems to have some validity as applied to initial public offerings (IPOs), but has far 
less persuasive force when applied to secondary market.  
The Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act (the Act) exhibits a structural departure 
from the existing securities regulatory framework by providing nearly 90% of IPOs with the 
status of emerging growth companies (EGCs) and an “à la carte” menu in various aspects of 
filings and disclosure. In theory, the structural change from a regime with “prix fixe” mandates 
to a regime with some à la carte elements shifts the tradeoff between regulatory burdens and 
investor protection from the regulator to the regulated firm, which allows for local optimization 
on a firm-by-firm basis rather than global optimization at the market level. In the absence of 
managerial opportunism, compared with the global optimization associated with prix fixe 
mandates, local optimization allowed by à la carte elements in the regulation is value enhancing 
or at least not value decreasing. However, one major uncertainty for the shift to a regime with 
some à la carte elements is whether managers respond opportunistically to promote the private 
benefits of control rather than act in the best interests of investors. 
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Because the à la carte elements of the Act are applicable to both the pre-IPO phase and 
the post-IPO phase, one important objective of the study is to isolate investors’ perception of the 
benefits and costs of the post-IPO provisions stipulated in the Act and the corresponding 
managerial responses. Prior studies find that the Act has changed the IPO landscape, including 
the volume and type of IPOs (e.g., Dambra et al. [2015]), the information environment for IPO 
firms (e.g., Barth et al. [2017]), and the cost of going public (e.g., Chaplinsky et al. [2017]). 
Therefore, in order to isolate the economic effects of post-IPO provisions, it is necessary to hold 
constant the IPO process and the information environment surrounding IPOs.  
The basic identification strategy is to utilize the uncommon practice of retroactive 
application of the Act. The Act was primarily applicable to firms conducting IPOs after the 
enactment date of April 5, 2012. However, the Act’s definition of an EGC retroactively applies 
to the IPOs priced between December 8, 2011, and April 5, 2012 (retro-activated EGCs). 
Conditional on a firm conducting an IPO prior to the enactment of the Act, whether it did so 
before or after December 8, 2011, is largely random with respect to the factors that generate 
cross-sectional variation in market responses to the enactment of the Act. This assumption 
appears reasonable given the significant lead-time involved in preparing and implementing an 
IPO.
1
 We choose firms that completed IPOs after January 1, 2011, but before December 8, 2011, 
that would have qualified as EGCs had the retroactive application been extended further back as 
the control group. Relative to the control group, the Act provides retro-activated EGCs with the à 
la carte menu in accounting, auditing, and executive compensation disclosure and voting in the 
post-IPO phase. A comparison between retro-activated EGCs’ and control firms’ market 
                                                 
1
 According to Dambra et al. [2015], the average time between the filing date of a registration statement and the 
actual issue date for all IPOs is 7 months. Prior to the filing of the registration statement, financial audits typically 
take about 2 to 3 months and drafting the registration statement typically takes about 1 to 2 months. Accordingly, we 
use a window that spans about 11 months prior to December 8, 2011, to construct control firms.  
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responses to the enactment of the Act captures investors’ perception of the structural shift in 
post-IPO regulation while holding constant the IPO process and the information environment 
surrounding IPOs.  
In addition to managerial opportunism, other potential costs of the shift from the prix fixe 
regime to the regime with à la carte elements include the loss of information available to 
investors and the loss of commitment to more stringent standards. The lack of commitment to 
more stringent standards could lead to increased market illiquidity (e.g., Baiman and Verrecchia 
[1996], Verrecchia [1999], Cheng et al. [2013]). Accordingly, investors’ perception of the à la 
carte elements in the Act is positive if expected benefits from local optimization exceed the 
potential costs from managerial opportunism and the loss of information and commitment, and 
vice versa.  
Empirically, we find that the average size and book-to-market adjusted stock return 
during the three-day enactment window of the Act for all retro-activated EGCs is 3.0% higher 
than that for control firms.
2
 Given that the average market capitalization of the retro-activated 
EGCs at the enactment of the Act is $852 million, the 3.0% difference in returns translates to a 
value premium of approximately $26 million for an average retro-activated EGC firm relative to 
an average control firm. The value premium greatly exceeds the estimated five-year savings in 
auditing fees of $1.14 million for an average retro-activated EGC firm. The economic magnitude 
suggests that investors attribute a large proportion of the net benefits of local optimization 
granted by the post-IPO provisions of the Act to aspects other than direct savings in compliance 
                                                 
2
 The overall effect is consistent with the average positive stock market response to a key legislative event on March 
15, 2012, that substantially increased the likelihood of the Senate’s passage of the bill documented in Dharmapala 
and Khanna [2016]. In robustness tests, we use March 15, 2012, as the event day and find consistent results. In 
addition, as Dharmapala and Khanna [2016] point out, the December 8th cutoff was first revealed to the public as a 
part of the draft legislation produced by the House Committee on Financial Services on March 1, 2012. We also 
compare market reaction around March 1, 2012, between retro-activated EGCs and control firms and find that the 
return difference between the two groups is statistically insignificant. The evidence suggests that investors started to 
assess the benefits provided to retro-activated EGCs under the Act when the passage of the bill became possible.    
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costs. Furthermore, following Cheng et al. [2013], we examine the change in illiquidity measures 
at the expiration of EGC status and when retro-activated EGCs opt out of the exemptions 
provided by the Act. We find no consistent evidence for a significant increase of information or 
an enhancement in commitment to more stringent standards as retro-activated EGCs return to the 
prix fixe mandates.
3
  
Among all retro-activated EGCs, smaller reporting companies (SRCs) have been eligible 
for the à la carte elements in disclosure of nonfinancial items in post-IPO periods since February 
2008. Under the Act, non-SRCs (firms with a public float greater than $75 million) are newly 
eligible for the à la carte elements in accounting, auditing, and executive compensation 
disclosure and voting in the post-IPO phase. Empirically, we find that the average size and book-
to-market adjusted stock return during the three-day enactment window of the Act for non-SRCs 
is 4.7% higher than that for SRCs, suggesting that investors’ perception of the net benefits of the 
post-IPO provisions is greater for non-SRCs.  
Rather than the average market response, this study’s primary interest is in the cross-
sectional variation in market responses to the change in the post-IPO regulatory framework. If 
investors attribute the net benefits of the à la carte elements largely to local optimization between 
compliance costs and investor protection on a firm-by-firm basis, we expect that the magnitude 
of market reaction to the enactment of the Act varies with a firm’s expected duration of EGC 
eligibility in the post-IPO period in the cross section. The Act stipulates that a firm is no longer 
eligible to be an EGC once its sales exceed $1 billion. Consistent with the cross-sectional 
prediction, we find that the stock return during the three-day enactment window for retro-
activated EGCs decreases with firm-level sales at the time of IPO and with sales growth rate in 
                                                 
3
 The increase in information and the enhancement in commitment to more stringent standards can potentially 
coexist as retro-activated EGCs return to the prix fixe mandates at the expiration of EGC status or when they stop 
electing the exemptions provided by the Act. Both effects can lead to a reduction in market illiquidity.   
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the pre-IPO period. The negative association between stock return and firm sales at IPO suggests 
that investors expect firms with lower sales to remain EGCs and reap the benefits from local 
optimization for a relatively longer duration. The negative association between stock return and 
growth rate suggests that investors expect fast-growing firms to grow out of EGC eligibility 
more quickly, which implies that those firms can reap the benefits from local optimization for a 
relatively shorter duration.  
Next, we examine whether managers in retro-activated EGCs indeed trade off the costs 
and benefits to investors in utilizing the à la carte elements or simply utilize these elements to 
promote and maintain the private benefits of control. We hand collect actual elections of the 
exemptions in accounting, auditing, and executive compensation disclosure and voting for each 
retro-activated EGC over the next five fiscal years (the maximum eligibility duration of the EGC 
status) from Form 10-Ks and proxy statements. Empirically, we use shareholder rights and 
executive compensation to proxy for managers’ private benefits of control and use firm size and 
research and development (R&D) intensity to proxy for firms’ marginal compliance costs and 
proprietary costs. We find that managers elect the exemptions in accounting, auditing, and 
executive compensation disclosure and voting that trade off benefits and costs to investors. In 
particular, dual-class firms are more likely to waive exemptions in all dimensions because timely 
and stringent monitoring of managers is especially needed to ensure investor protection when 
shareholder rights are relatively weak. Furthermore, managers in firms with greater R&D 
intensity are more likely to elect the option to delay the adoption of new accounting standards, 
potentially to delay disclosure of proprietary information, as investors in those firms bear greater 
proprietary costs. Managers in smaller firms are more likely to elect the exemption from auditor 
attestation under the section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the exemption to 
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comply with new requirements adopted by Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) because investors in smaller firms bear greater marginal compliance costs. 
However, we also find evidence that managers utilize the à la carte elements in order to 
promote or maintain private benefits of control. For instance, retro-activated EGCs with 
relatively higher incentive compensation for CEOs and CFOs are more likely to choose the 
reduced disclosure for executive compensation and to choose the exemption from a shareholder 
“say-on-pay” vote on executive compensation, potentially to avoid investor scrutiny.  
This study contributes to the existing literature in several aspects. First, we find that 
investors respond positively to the à la carte elements in regulation and that the market response 
varies with the expected duration of a firm’s eligibility for the à la carte elements in the cross-
section. These findings contribute to the literature on the optimal design of securities regulation. 
The evidence indicates that a regulatory framework with à la carte elements compares favorably 
to a prix fixe framework by shifting the tradeoff between compliance costs and investor 
protection from the regulator to the regulated firm, which enables local optimization on a firm-
by-firm basis. Furthermore, the benefits from local optimization exceed the potential costs from 
managerial opportunism and the loss of information or commitment. In light of the long-standing 
debate on voluntary disclosure and the need for a mandatory disclosure system, this study 
suggests that a feasible alternative is to provide voluntary choices within the mandatory 
framework. 
Second, this study contributes to the literature on the economic consequences of the Act. 
While prior studies examine the effects of the Act on the IPO process and the cost of going 
public (e.g., Dambra et al. [2015], Barth et al. [2017], Chaplinsky et al. [2017]), little is known 
about how the Act changes the benefits and costs of being public in the post-IPO phase. 
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However, it is important to understand investors’ perception of and managers’ response to the 
post-IPO provisions in the Act because the post-IPO provisions have ongoing economic effects 
for a given firm in contrast to the one-time effect of the pre-IPO provisions.  
Third, while prior studies mostly examine the economic consequences of the voluntary-
to-mandatory regime shift (e.g., Lo [2003], Iliev [2000], Zhang [2007]), this study examines the 
economic consequences of the mandatory-to-voluntary regime shift embedded in the post-IPO 
provisions of the Act. A closely related study is Cheng et al. [2013], which finds that SRCs that 
have the option to disclose a “reduced” set of nonfinancial items but decide to maintain their 
disclosure level experience an increase in market illiquidity. They interpret the results as 
meaning that mandatory disclosure serves as a credible commitment mechanism and that losing 
such commitment is costly even in the absence of a loss of information. Although the SRC rules 
pertain only to the disclosure of nonfinancial information, the Act addresses a comprehensive set 
of mandatory-to-voluntary shifts in accounting, auditing, and executive compensation disclosure 
and voting. In contrast, we find no significant decrease in market illiquidity as retro-activated 
EGCs return to the prix fixe mandates at the expiration of their EGC status or when they no 
longer elect exemptions under the Act. One possible explanation for the differential results is the 
different information environments that SRCs and retro-activated EGCs face. Compared with 
retro-activated EGCs, SRCs are rather small firms that have limited analyst and media coverage, 
and, therefore, mandatory reports are the main, if not the only, source of information for SRC 
investors. The different results from the two studies suggest that we need to assess the economic 
effects of regulatory changes in the context of the information environment.
4
  
                                                 
4
 Another possible reason is articulated in the caveat discussion in the introduction of Cheng et al. [2013]. They 
point out that the testing period for SRC Regulatory Relief and Simplification coincides with the onset of the 
financial crisis in 2007, which is likely to manifest an increase in market illiquidity in the post period.  
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Fourth, the findings from this study also shed light on the emerging “regulatory sandbox” 
practice. The regulatory sandbox is the general framework that regulators in many countries 
outside the United States, such as the United Kingdom and Singapore, have adopted in regulating 
the fintech sector. This framework provides a more favorable regulatory environment to 
encourage innovation and facilitate growth. In essence, the Act is a special form of regulatory 
sandbox because it eases regulatory burdens for EGCs in the IPO process and in subsequent 
public reporting. However, a major concern for the regulatory sandbox is managerial 
opportunism in minimizing regulation and compliance that could stifle growth or harm investors 
and consumers. For instance, Gao et al. [2009] document that managers in non-accelerated filers 
that are exempted from section 404 of SOX took growth-inhibiting actions to keep those firms 
below the bright-line threshold of eligibility for the exemption. However, our finding that 
managers trade off benefits and costs to investors in electing some exemptions provided by the 
Act mitigates the general concern of a “race to the bottom” in implementing the regulatory 
sandbox. 
 
II. Related literature, institutional background and hypothesis development  
The Act reduces the required disclosure and compliance obligations during the IPO 
process and the first five years of being a public company. In the pre-IPO phase, the Act 
provides EGCs the option to solicit prefiling interest from investors about an offer, the option to 
file its registration statement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
confidentially, and the option to scale down financial and executive compensation disclosure in 
the IPO filing. In the post-IPO phase, the Act provides EGCs the option to scale down 
requirements in accounting, auditing, and executive compensation disclosure and voting. An 
EGC is defined as an issuer that has less than $1 billion in annual gross revenues during its most 
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recent fiscal year, had not sold common equity securities under a registration statement as of 
December 8, 2011, has not issued more than $1 billion in non-convertible debt securities over the 
past three years and is not a "large accelerated filer."
5
  
Existing studies find that the Act has changed the IPO landscape. For instance, Dambra et 
al. [2015] find that the Act has increased the volume of IPOs and changed the type of firms that 
choose to go public. Notably, biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms experienced the highest 
growth in IPOs after the Act. Barth et al. [2017] find that the reduction in mandatory disclosure 
in the pre-IPO phase increases information uncertainty in the IPO market after the Act. 
Chaplinsky et al. [2017] find no reduction in the direct costs of going public, but an increase in 
the indirect costs of going public (as measured by underpricing) for EGCs compared with other 
IPOs.  
While prior studies have examined the economic consequences of the pre-IPO provisions 
in the Act, there is virtually no empirical evidence on how the Act affects the benefits and costs 
of being public in the post-IPO phase. One major empirical difficulty in examining the net 
benefits of the post-IPO provisions is that the Act includes both pre-IPO provisions and post-IPO 
provisions. Accordingly, an important objective of the study is to isolate investors’ perception of 
the net benefits of the post-IPO provisions stipulated in the Act.  
The Act’s provisions are primarily applicable to firms conducting IPOs after the 
enactment date of April 5, 2012. However, the Act’s definition of an EGC retroactively applies 
to the IPOs priced between December 8, 2011, and April 5, 2012. This unique retroactive 
application enables us to examine the cross-sectional variation in both investors’ perceptions of 
and managers’ responses to the post-IPO provisions in the Act among retro-activated EGCs 
                                                 
5
 See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Emerging Growth Companies, 
https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/goingpublic/EGC. In April 2017, the EGC revenue cap under the Act was raised 
to $1.07 billion to adjust for inflation. 
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while holding constant the IPO process and the information environment surrounding IPOs. 
Specifically, we choose as control firms those that completed IPOs after January 1, 2011, but 
before December 8, 2011, that would have qualified as EGCs had the retroactive application 
been extended further back. As the IPO process for both retro-activated EGCs and control firms 
occurred prior to the enactment of the Act, the pre-IPO provisions of the Act are not applicable 
to both groups. Accordingly, relative to the control group, the Act provides retro-activated EGCs 
with the à la carte elements stipulated in the post-IPO provisions. Furthermore, as both the retro-
activated EGCs and the control firms went public before the enactment of the Act, it mitigates 
the endogeneity concern that the Act itself changes the type of firms that go public.  
The Act itself exhibits a significant departure from the existing framework of securities 
regulation to the extent that EGCs are provided with à la carte elections rather than prix fixe 
mandates on a number of dimensions within the mandatory framework. There are five à la carte 
options in the post-IPO provisions. The first is the option to delay the adoption of new or revised 
accounting standards. The second is to exempt EGCs from an auditor’s attestation of internal 
control. The third is to exempt EGCs from any future requirements by the PCAOB of mandatory 
audit firm rotation or a supplement to the auditor's report providing additional information about 
the audit and the financial statements. The fourth is the option to elect “reduced” executive 
compensation disclosure.
6
 The fifth option is to exempt EGCs from a shareholder advisory vote 
on executive compensation (“say-on-pay” or “say-on-golden parachute”).  
The post-IPO mandatory requirements have the central objective of ongoing investor 
protection. However, some public firms believe that the post-IPO mandates impose a substantial 
                                                 
6
 The executive compensation disclosures of EGCs may follow the reduced set of requirements applicable to SRCs, 
rather than the full-fledged requirements applicable to larger companies. Specifically, EGCs need not provide a 
compensation discussion and analysis, may present compensation data for fewer named executive officers, and may 
omit some of the tables required for other companies. 
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regulatory burden and damage their competitive advantage. For instance, the SEC IPO Task 
Force surveyed CEOs whose firms recently went public and identified the administrative burdens 
of public reporting and the reallocation of CEOs’ time to reporting and compliance and away 
from company building as the top two challenges (SEC IPO Task Force, 2011). Similarly, in a 
PwC survey of newly public companies, 45% of firms indicated that the costs of being public 
exceeded their expectations.
7
  
In theory, relative to prix fixe mandates, à la carte elements in regulation shift the 
tradeoff between compliance costs and investor protection from the regulator to the regulated 
firm, which enables local optimization on a firm-by-firm basis rather than global optimization at 
the market level. In the absence of managerial opportunism and compared with the global 
optimization associated with prix fixe mandates, local optimization allowed by à la carte 
elements in regulation is value enhancing or at least not value decreasing under all three possible 
scenarios. First, if the mandated disclosure level by regulators is above the endogenously 
determined optimal level for a given firm, local optimization enables the firm to reduce the 
disclosure level to its optimal amount, which is value enhancing. Second, if the mandated 
disclosure level by regulators is already optimal for a given firm, the à la carte elements in the 
regulation allow, but do not require, eligible firms to reduce the disclosure level, which suggests 
that the à la carte elements are not value decreasing. Third, if the mandated disclosure level by 
regulators is below the endogenously determined optimal level for a given firm, the firm has 
incentives to increase its disclosure level voluntarily regardless of whether the mandatory 
requirements are prix-fixe or with some à la carte elements.  
                                                 
7
 PwC, ‘Considering an IPO to Fuel Your Company’s Future?’ November 2017. Available at 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/deals/publications/assets/cost-of-an-ipo.pdf 
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However, one major uncertainty for the shift from prix fixe mandates to the regulatory 
framework with some à la carte elements is whether managers behave opportunistically by acting 
in their own interests rather than in the best interests of investors. A possible outcome is the so-
called race to the bottom where all managers in eligible firms choose to disclose the minimum 
possible amount of information allowed under the à la carte elements in regulation in order to 
minimize their own compliance time and efforts. A race to the bottom is likely to result in a loss 
of information available to investors or to exacerbate agency problems between managers and 
investors, or both (e.g., Verrecchia [1983], Jensen and Meckling [1976]). Furthermore, another 
concern for the shift from prix fixe mandates to à la carte elements is the lack of commitment to 
more stringent standards, which could lead to increased market illiquidity (e.g., Baiman and 
Verrecchia [1996], Verrecchia [1999], Cheng et al. [2013]). All those concerns are potentially 
costly to investors.  
Accordingly, on average, investors’ perception of the à la carte elements in the post-IPO 
provisions in the Act is positive when expected benefits from local optimization exceed the 
potential costs from managerial opportunism and the loss of information and commitment. 
However, if the potential costs exceed expected benefits from local optimization, investors’ 
perception of the à la carte elements is negative. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
H1: Relative to control firms, the average market reaction to the enactment of the Act is higher 
(lower) for retro-activated EGCs if expected benefits associated with local optimization are 
higher (lower) than the potential costs from managerial opportunism and the loss of information 
and commitment.  
  
 In the cross-section, among all retro-activated EGCs, there is a subgroup of SRCs that 
have been eligible for the à la carte element in disclosure of nonfinancial items, such as risk 
disclosure and executive compensation disclosure under the Smaller Reporting Company 
Regulatory Relief and Simplification since February 2008. In particular, the option for reduced 
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executive compensation disclosure under the SRC rules is a subset of the à la carte elements 
stipulated in the post-IPO provisions of the Act. In contrast, non-SRCs with a public float greater 
than $75 million are the subgroup of retro-activated EGCs that are newly eligible for the à la 
carte elements in regulation. Furthermore, the à la carte elements in the post-IPO provisions of 
the Act span multiple dimensions in accounting, auditing, and executive compensation disclosure 
and voting, which significantly expands the option provided under the SRC rules. Therefore, the 
benefits associated with local optimization could be greater for retro-activated EGCs that are 
newly eligible for the à la carte elements in the post-IPO provisions under the Act.  
 According to the Act, the maximum on-ramp time for EGC status is five years after a 
firm’s IPO. Once the EGC eligibility is lost, the issuer is no longer entitled to the à la carte 
elements. We expect the benefits of the à la carte elements vary positively with the expected 
duration for EGC eligibility in the cross-section. In particular, holding constant the sales growth 
rate, the lower the pre-IPO sales, the longer the firm is able to enjoy the à la carte elements of the 
Act, and the higher the expected benefits associated with local optimization in the post-IPO 
period. Similarly, holding constant the sales level at IPO, the lower the sales growth rate, the 
longer the firm is able to enjoy the à la carte elements of the regulation, and the higher the 
expected benefits associated with local optimization in the post-IPO period.  
To summarize, in the absence of managerial opportunism, the short-window market 
return at the enactment of the Act is expected to be higher for non-SRCs and for retro-activated 
EGCs with a longer expected duration for EGC eligibility. On the other hand, more à la carte 
elements and a longer expected duration for EGC eligibility could potentially impose greater 
costs associated with managers’ opportunism and the loss of information and commitment. If 
potential costs exceed the expected benefits, the stock return to the enactment of the Act is 
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expected to be lower for non-SRCs that are newly eligible for the à la carte elements and for 
retro-activated EGCs that have a longer expected duration for the EGC eligibility. This leads to 
the second hypothesis on the cross-sectional variation:  
H2a: The short-window market return at the enactment of the Act is higher (lower) for non-SRCs 
than for SRCs if the expected benefits associated with local optimization are higher (lower) than 
the potential costs from managerial opportunism and the loss of information and commitment.  
 
H2b: The short-window market return at the enactment of the Act increases (decreases) with the 
expected duration for EGC eligibility if the expected benefits associated with local optimization 
are higher (lower) than the potential costs from managerial opportunism and the loss of 
information and commitment.  
 
The post-IPO provisions in the Act provide à la carte exemptions from existing post-IPO 
mandates in multiple dimensions. We broadly classify the post-IPO exemptions into three 
categories: accounting, auditing, and executive compensation disclosure and voting. For a given 
dimension, some firms could be at the optimal point based on the tradeoff between regulatory 
burdens and investor protection under the existing post-IPO regulatory requirements prior to the 
Act, while other firms could be at a suboptimal point. Firms also evolve over time. For a given 
firm, a specific mandate may be optimal at one time, but be suboptimal at another time. In the 
absence of agency problems, managers will trade off benefits and costs to investors in electing 
different exemptions from the à la carte menu.  
More stringent standards in accounting, auditing, and executive compensation disclosure 
and voting impose greater compliance costs and reveal more competitively sensitive information 
(e.g., Verrecchia [1983], Darrough and Stoughton [1990], Feltham and Xie [1992], Darrough 
[1993], Gigler [1994]). Due to the fixed component in compliance costs, the marginal 
compliance cost is higher for smaller firms (e.g., Eldridge and Kealey [2005], A.R.C. Morgan 
[2005]). If managers in smaller firms act in the best interests of investors, they are more likely to 
elect the exemptions from more stringent requirements in accounting, auditing, and executive 
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compensation disclosure and voting to lower the compliance burden. Furthermore, firms with 
more R&D activities bear greater proprietary costs in adopting more stringent accounting 
standards and disclosure. The proposed new accounting standards during the five fiscal years 
(2012–17) after the enactment of the Act are largely related to R&D–intensive firms. For 
instance, Accounting Standards Update 2015-02 amends the consolidation analysis for R&D 
arrangements. As such, we expect that, if managers act in the best interests of investors, 
managers in firms with more R&D activities are more likely to elect the option to delay the 
adoption of new accounting standards to delay the revelation of competitively sensitive 
information. 
More stringent standards in accounting, auditing, and executive compensation disclosure 
and voting promote more timely and effective monitoring of managers and, therefore, reduces 
managers’ private benefits of control (e.g., Lo [2003], Huang and Zhang [2012]). In the presence 
of agency costs, the election of exemptions depends on the bargaining power of the investors and 
the managers. Generally speaking, managers have greater private benefits of control in firms 
with greater agency costs. If managers in firms with greater agency costs have more bargaining 
power than investors, they are more likely to choose the exemptions to maintain or increase their 
private control benefits. However, in firms with greater agency costs, timely and effective 
monitoring of managers is especially needed to ensure investor protection. Realizing the agency 
problems, investors, if equipped with strong bargaining power, can demand that managers waive 
exemptions under the Act and maintain the prix fixe mandates to protect their interests.   
In summary, it is uncertain whether managers in retro-activated EGCs act in their own 
interests or in shareholders’ interests in response to the à la carte elements in the Act. Therefore, 
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we develop two non–mutually exclusive hypotheses on how managers elect exemptions allowed 
by the post-IPO provisions of the Act. This leads to the third hypothesis:  
H3a: Managers in retro-activated EGCs trade off costs and benefits in favor of investors in 
utilizing the à la carte elements over the eligible period under the Act. 
  
H3b: Managers in retro-activated EGCs act in their private interests in utilizing the à la carte 
elements over the eligible period under the Act. 
  
III. Sample selection and summary statistics 
To construct the retro-activated EGC sample, we select U.S. IPOs that satisfied the 
qualifying conditions of EGCs (see section II for details) and that priced between December 8, 
2011, and April 5, 2012, from Thomson Reuters SDC New Issue database. To construct the 
control sample, we select firms that completed IPOs between January 1, 2011, and December 8, 
2011, but that would have qualified as EGCs had the retroactive application been extended 
further back.  
We define five indicator variables corresponding to the stop of the election of the five 
exemptions.
8
  For the retro-activated EGC sample, we collect the EGC status and the elections of 
the five exemptions until the fifth fiscal year after IPO, which is the maximum on-ramp time for 
EGC status allowed by the Act. We manually collect EGCs’ elections of the five exemptions 
from various parts of their SEC filings. Specifically, we collect a firm’s election of delaying 
adoption of new accounting standards by reading “Recent Accounting Pronouncements” in the 
notes to the consolidated financial statements. The indicator variable DELAY is coded as one if a 
firm stops this election and zero otherwise. We collect a firm’s election of the exemption to 
comply with auditor attestation requirements of section 404 of SOX by examining whether the 
“Management’s Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting” includes an auditor 
                                                 
8
 We set the indicator variable to one when a firm stops electing a particular exemption and zero otherwise. This is 
to mimic the single target event in typical survival analyses (e.g., death happens only once for a particular patient). 
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attestation report. The indicator variable AUDATT is coded as one if a firm stops this election 
and zero otherwise. We collect a firm’s election of the exemption to comply with any future 
requirements that the PCAOB may adopt by reading materials regarding “Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board” or “PCAOB” in 10-Ks. The indicator variable PCAOB is coded as 
one if a firm stops this election and zero otherwise. We collect a firm’s election of the reduced 
executive compensation disclosure and the exemption from a non-binding advisory vote on 
executive compensation and the stockholder approval of any golden parachute payments by 
reading Item 11 Executive Compensation in the 10-K or the corresponding Proxy Statement 
(DEF 14A). The indicator variable REDDIS is coded as one if a firm stops the election of the 
reduced disclosure of executive compensation and zero otherwise. The indicator variable VOTE 
is coded as one if a firm stops the election of the exemption from shareholders’ “say-on-pay” and 
“say-on-golden parachute” and zero otherwise. We also complement the data on elections of 
exemptions by reading Item 1A Risk Factors in the 10-K, where firms frequently discuss the 
elections of the five exemptions and the potential risks.  
We use dual-class share structure (DUALCLASS) to proxy for greater ex ante agency 
costs because the differential voting power associated with the two classes of shares allows 
managers to have superior voting rights relative to outside shareholders (e.g., Masulis et al. 
[2009], McGuire et al. [2014]). In firms with greater agency problems and weaker governance 
structures, top executives receive higher compensation (e.g., Core et al. [1999]). If managers 
receive higher compensation as a result of weak governance structures, overpaid CEOs and 
CFOs are more likely to elect the option for reduced executive compensation disclosure and elect 
the exemption from shareholders’ “say-on-pay” vote in order to maintain or increase private 
control benefits. However, if managers receive higher compensation because of their greater 
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capability and skills (e.g., Falato et al. [2015]), they may be less likely to elect the two 
exemptions. More able managers improve a firm’s performance (e.g., Demerjian et al. [2012]). 
Hence, they may be more likely to choose existing prix-fixe mandates on executive 
compensation disclosure and shareholders’ “say-on-pay” vote, which mitigate contract friction 
and increase firm value (e.g., Lo [2003], Cai and Walkling [2011]). 
We hand collect data on firms’ dual-class status, CEO and CFO compensation, and filing 
status (a large accelerated filer, an accelerated filer, a non-accelerated filer or an SRC) from 10-
Ks and proxy statements. We obtain financial data from COMPUSTAT, stock price and return 
data from CRSP, and audit and non-audit fees from Audit Analytics. The final sample includes 
48 retro-activated EGCs and 97 control firms. 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the retro-activated EGCs and the control sample. 
Panel A shows that 6% (9%) of the EGC (control) sample are SRCs. The average sales (SALES) 
at IPO are $0.17 billion and $0.16 billion, while the average sales growth rates (SALEG) are 
1.07 and 1.35 for the EGC and control samples, respectively. The average book-to-market ratio 
(BTM) is 0.24 for the EGC sample and 0.75 for the control sample. The difference is significant 
at the 1% level, which validates the necessity to adjust raw returns for BTM. The average market 
capitalization measured in millions (MCAP) is $851.56 and $802.63, while the average natural 
log of market cap (SIZE) is 6.17 and 5.87 for the EGC and control samples, respectively. We 
follow Dharan and Ikenberry [1995] in adjusting returns for BTM and SIZE. ARETAPR5 for each 
firm is measured as the buy-hold return over the three-day period starting April 5, 2012, in 
excess of the buy-hold return on its SIZE and BTM matched portfolio over the same period. The 
average ARETAPR5 is 3% for the EGC sample and 0% for the control sample. Given the average 
market capitalization of $851.56 million for the EGC sample, the 3% return difference between 
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the EGC and the control sample translates to an approximately $26 million value premium for an 
average EGC firm, which is both statistically and economically significant.      
Panel B of table 1 reports the Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman (below diagonal) 
correlations of the variables presented in panel A. On a univariate base, retro-activated EGCs 
(RETRO) have higher abnormal returns at the enactment of the Act (ARETAPR5) and lower 
BTM. As expected, SRCs have lower SALES, SIZE, and ARETAPR5.  
 
IV. Main empirical results 
4.1 Investors’ perception of the enactment of the Act 
To examine the average and cross-sectional variations in EGCs’ market response to the 
enactment of the Act, we run the following regression: 
𝐴𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑃𝑅5 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑂 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑅𝐶 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑇𝑀 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆 + 𝛽6𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑂
∗ 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆 + 𝛽7𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽8𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑂 ∗ 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝐺 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀 
(1) 
Among the variables of interest, β1 captures the average return difference between retro-activated 
EGCs and the control sample. A positive (negative) β1 indicates that, for an average retro-
activated EGC firm, investors believe the expected benefits associated with local optimization 
afforded by the Act are higher (lower) than the potential costs from loss of information and lack 
of commitment to more stringent reporting standards (H1). β2 captures the average return 
difference between SRCs and non-SRCs (H2a). Finally, β6 and β8 capture how ARETAPR5 for 
retro-activated EGCs varies with the expected duration of the EGC eligibility (H2b). 
Table 2 reports the results from equation (1). We control for industry fixed effects in all 
regressions, where industries are defined by Fama-French 12 industry classifications. In column 
1, explanatory variables include RETRO, SRC, BTM, and SIZE. The coefficient on RETRO is 
0.034 (t = 3.78), which suggests that retro-activated EGCs, on average, reported 3.4% higher 
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abnormal returns over the three-day period at the enactment of the Act than control firms, ceteris 
paribus. This magnitude is in line with the 3% return difference reported in table 1 panel A.
9
 
These positive abnormal returns for retro-activated EGCs indicate that investors view the 
benefits associated with the Act as higher than the potential costs from managerial opportunism 
and the loss of information and commitment. Furthermore, the coefficient on SRC is -0.047 (t 
= -2.61), which suggests that on average non-SRCs reported 4.7% higher returns over the 
enactment window of the Act than SRCs, ceteris paribus. This is consistent with SRCs receiving 
lower net benefits from the Act as they had been eligible for some scaled-down mandatory 
requirements in the post-IPO phase since February 2008. Finally, the significantly positive 
coefficient on BTM indicates the book-to-market ratio still predicts abnormal returns even 
though the abnormal return is book-to-market adjusted. 
In column 2, we include SALES and the interaction term between SALES and RETRO 
(RETRO*SALES) as additional explanatory variables. We still observe results on RETRO, SRC, 
and BTM consistent with those reported in column 1. Interestingly, the coefficient on 
RETRO*SALES is -0.100 (t = -2.18), indicating that investors expect retro-activated EGCs with 
higher sales at IPO to maintain their EGC status for a shorter duration and hence receive lower 
net benefits from the regulatory change.  
In column 3, we add SALEG and its interaction term with RETRO (RETRO*SALEG) as 
additional explanatory variables. Although the coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant, 
                                                 
9
 A potential concern is that IPO underpricing (see Ljungqvist [2007]) could account for the higher returns of these 
retro-activated EGCs listed close to April 5. To address this concern, we perform two robustness checks. First, we 
use March 15, 2012, as the event day and find results consistent with those in Dharmapala and Khanna [2016]. The 
return difference between the EGC sample (reduced to 34 IPOs) and the control sample is 2% with t-statistic of 2.15 
(untabulated). Second, we exclude the 14 EGCs priced during the three weeks between March 15 and April 5, 2012, 
and examine the remaining EGCs’ market reaction to the enactment of the Act. We continue to find a significant 
return difference of 2% with t-statistic of 2.35 (untabulated) between the EGCs and the control firms. Results from 
the robustness tests suggest that IPO underpricing cannot explain away the return difference between the EGCs and 
control firms.  
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the coefficient on SALEG is -0.003 and statistically significant (t = -1.76), suggesting that the 
market return decreases with sales growth rate in the pre-IPO period for both EGCs and control 
firms. The negative coefficient on sales growth indicates that fast-growing firms are likely to 
grow out of either the SRC status or the EGC status more quickly, therefore benefiting less from 
the à la carte elements embedded in both the SRC rules and the Act. In column 4, we report the 
full specification of equation (1) and find results similar to those reported in the previous 
columns.  
In summary, we find that stock returns over the enactment window of the Act are higher 
for retro-activated EGCs than for control firms, suggesting investors expect retro-activated EGCs 
to receive net benefits from the Act. The market reaction to the Act is lower for SRCs. Moreover, 
stock returns of the retro-activated EGCs over the enactment window of the Act decrease with 
retro-activated EGCs’ sales at IPO. Furthermore, both retro-activated EGCs and control firms’ 
stock returns over the enactment window decrease with sales growth rate.  
As discussed previously, we estimate that the exemptions provide an approximately $26 
million value premium to the average EGC firm. We attempt to quantify the benefits from the 
exemptions in the Act in terms of direct savings on selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) 
expenses, especially audit fees. Table 3 reports annual average SG&A expenses, audit fees 
(AUDITFEE), non-audit fees (NAUDITFEE) and total fees (TOTALFEE) as a percentage of 
total assets for retro-activated EGCs and control firms over the five years after IPO, which is the 
maximum on-ramp time allowed by the Act. On a univariate base, there is no significant 
difference in annual SG&A expenses between the retro-activated EGCs and control firms over 
the five years after IPO. However, when we examine audit fees in particular, we notice a 
significant difference between retro-activated EGCs and control firms. Specifically, the average 
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audit fee is 0.32% of total assets for retro-activated EGCs and 0.42% for control firms, with the 
difference significant at the 10% level (t = -1.69). Although on average retro-activated EGCs 
also report lower non-audit fees, the difference is not statistically significant (t = -1.35). Finally, 
there is a significant difference in total audit fees (TOTALFEE, sum of AUDITFEE and 
NAUDITFEE) between the two samples with a t-statistic of -1.81.  
Because several exemptions are directly or indirectly related to auditors (such as 
DELAY, AUDATT, and PCAOB), the evidence in table 3 suggests that these exemptions 
provide direct cost savings for an average retro-activated EGC firm. Combining the average total 
assets (TA) of $1,379 million and the average audit fee (AUDITFEE) of 0.32% for the retro-
activated EGCs, we estimate the annual audit fee at $4.38 million for an average retro-activated 
EGC. Similarly, we estimate the annual audit fee at $4.61 million for an average control firm. 
This suggests that an average EGC firm can save $0.23 million in audit fees annually or $1.15 
million over five years after IPO. The direct savings in audit fees is relatively small compared to 
the value premium of $26 million for the average retro-activated EGC. The evidence suggests 
that investors attribute a large proportion of the net benefits of the post-IPO provisions to aspects 
other than savings in direct compliance costs.  
 
4.2 Managers’ responses to the exemptions in retro-activated EGCs  
In this section, we examine the transition of the retro-activated EGCs and their elections 
of the exemptions over the five years after IPO. Panel A of table 4 reports the transition matrix of 
the 48 retro-activated EGCs. Specifically, 92% of retro-activated EGCs still qualified for EGC 
status at the first fiscal year-end after IPO. As these firms grew over time, some had sales bigger 
than the EGC threshold of $1 billion and lost EGC status. The percentage of firms that were 
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eligible for EGC status gradually reduces to 29% at the fifth fiscal year-end after IPO. In 
addition, nine retro-activated EGCs (19% of the sample) were either acquired or delisted at the 
fifth fiscal year-end after IPO.  
Because some retro-activated EGCs lost EGC eligibility over time, we construct two 
distinct samples to analyze managers’ elections of the à la carte elements. The first sample 
(labelled as “all firm-year sample”) includes all firm-year observations for the 48 retro-activated 
EGCs over the five-year period after IPO. As 19 firm-year observations are excluded due to 
delisting or acquisition, the all firm-year sample includes 221 firm-year observations. The second 
sample (labelled as “EGC-eligible sample”) is limited to firm-year observations where retro-
activated EGCs are still eligible for EGC status. The EGC-eligible sample includes 129 firm-year 
observations. Panel B of table 4 reports the summary statistics of the two samples. DELAY, 
AUDATT, PCAOB, REDDIS, and VOTE correspond to the stop of the election of the five 
exemptions. For example, the average of DELAY in the first sample is 0.91, which suggests that 
91% of the 221 firm-year observations opted out of the option to delay adopting new and revised 
accounting standards. Some retro-activated EGCs opted out of the exemptions simply because 
they were no longer eligible. In the EGC-eligible sample, the average DELAY is 0.84, which 
suggests that 84% of the 129 firm-year observations chose to opt out of the option to delay 
adopting new accounting standards even though they were eligible for the exemption. Among the 
five exemptions, the least opted out (most elected) exemption is the exemption from SOX 
section 404 auditor attestation of internal control, which is evident from the mean AUDATT of 
0.53 in the all firm-year sample and 0.20 in the EGC-eligible sample. In contrast, the most opted 
out (least elected) exemption is the exemption to comply with any future standards adopted by 
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the PCAOB, which is evident from the mean PCAOB of 0.97 in the all firm-year sample and 
0.95 in the EGC-eligible sample. 
10
 
As shown in panel B of table 4, over the five years after IPO, the average firm has $0.52 
billion in sales revenue (SALES) and invests 33% of revenue in R&D (RDINT) for the all firm-
year sample. However, firms in the EGC-eligible sample were considerably smaller with an 
average of $0.18 billion in revenue, but with 42% of sales invested in R&D on average. The 
average firm reports a negative return on assets (ROA) of -0.11 (-0.15) and has 1.41 (1.29) 
business segments (SEGMENT) in the all firm-year (EGC-eligible) sample. Dual-class share 
structure (DUALCLASS) is found in 14% (6%) of firms in the all firm-year (EGC-eligible) 
sample. The average firm has an annual sales growth rate (SALEG) of 0.36 and 0.34 in the two 
samples, which fits well with the image of EGCs. Finally, the average firm pays a comparable 
amount of total compensation (including salary, bonus, and other compensation) to its CEO and 
CFO, with average CEOPAY of 13.91 (13.69) and CFOPAY of 13.09 (12.58) in the all firm-year 
(EGC-eligible) sample, respectively. The average incentive pay for CEOs and CFOs combined 
(such as bonuses, stock awards, option awards, and non-equity incentive plans) is 13.85 (13.54) 
for the all firm-year (EGC-eligible) sample, which is the largest component of executive 
compensation.
11
 
Panel C of table 4 reports the Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman (below diagonal) 
correlations of the EGC-eligible sample. On a univariate base, DELAY is positively correlated 
with AUDATT, but is negatively correlated with REDDIS and VOTE. The correlation between 
                                                 
10
 The PCAOB encountered fierce resistance to the proposal of mandatory auditor rotation. In 2013, the House of 
Representatives passed a bill that would have amended the SOX to prohibit the PCAOB from requiring companies 
to “use specific auditors or require the use of different auditors on a rotating basis”. This may explain why the least 
elected exemption under the Act is the exemption to comply with future requirements adopted by the PCAOB. 
11
 The average salary for CEOs and CFOs combined is 12.81 and 12.74, and the average other compensation is 9.17 
and 8.32 for the two samples, respectively. Other compensation includes a great variety of items, such as corporate 
housing, transportation, and legal services. 
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the elections of the two exemptions on executive compensation (REDDIS and VOTE) is as high 
as 0.64. Furthermore, the election variables are correlated with proxies for compliance costs and 
investor protection. For instance, both DELAY and AUDATT have positive correlations with 
SALES, indicating that larger firms are more likely to opt out of these two exemptions. This is 
consistent with small firms being disproportionately affected by compliance costs (e.g., Eldridge 
and Kealey [2005], A.R.C. Morgan [2005]). RDINT is negatively correlated with DELAY, 
AUDATT, and PCAOB, suggesting that firms with high proprietary costs are more likely to elect 
these three exemptions. AUDATT is positively correlated with DUALCLASS, suggesting that 
more stringent disclosure of internal controls is especially needed to protect shareholder rights in 
dual-class firms where managers have superior voting rights (e.g., Masulis et al. [2009], 
McGuire et al. [2014]).  
We use the COX proportional hazard model to examine the cross-sectional determinants 
of the elections of the exemptions under the Act. We track each firm’s election of every 
exemption under the Act until the firm no longer elects that particular exemption or is no longer 
eligible for EGC status. Opting out of delaying adoption of new and revised accounting 
standards is irrevocable under the Act. We manually check the other four exemptions to confirm 
that once a firm stopped the election of a particular exemption, it did not re-elect it in future 
years. We estimate the hazard model as follows:  
𝜆(𝑡) = 𝜆0(𝑡)𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽1𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐷2𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐸𝐺𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽5𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐶𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆
+ 𝛽6𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑌 + 𝛽8𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑌 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡) 
(2) 
 
Table 5 reports the hazard model results. For each election, we report a specification 
without compensation variables, the specification in equation (2), and a slightly modified 
specification from equation (2) where we replace CEOPAY and CFOPAY with the three 
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components of the combined compensation of CEOs and CFOs. First, the coefficient on 
DUALCLASS is consistently positive for all five exemptions with chi-square statistics ranging 
from 2.74 to 26.29, indicating that firms with dual-class share structures are more likely to opt 
out of (less likely to elect) all exemptions. This is consistent with the interpretation that timely 
and stringent monitoring of managers is especially needed to ensure investor protection when 
shareholder rights are relatively weak. Second, the coefficient on CEOPAY is consistently 
negative for all five exemptions with chi-square statistics ranging from 2.82 to 5.88, suggesting 
that firms with higher CEO total compensation are less likely to opt out of (more likely to elect) 
all exemptions. However, the interpretation could be contextual depending on the underlying 
reasons for higher CEO pay and the specific exemption. According to SEC IPO Task Force 
[2011], CEOs of public firms identify the administrative burdens of public reporting and the 
reallocation of their time to reporting and compliance and away from company building as their 
top two challenges. If higher pay reflects the CEO’s competence (Falato et al. [2015]), the 
negative coefficient on CEOPAY in the elections of DELAY, AUDATT, and PCAOB is 
consistent with the interpretation that managers act in the best interests of investors. In particular, 
competent CEOs are more likely to elect the accounting and auditing exemptions to reduce the 
firm’s burden of public reporting and compliance, which allows them to focus their efforts and 
time on improving firm performance, which is beneficial to investors. On the other hand, if 
higher CEO pay reflects poor governance (Core et al. [1999]), the negative coefficient on 
CEOPAY in the election of REDDIS and VOTE is consistent with the interpretation that 
managers act in their private interests. In particular, overpaid CEOs use the exemptions on 
executive compensation disclosure and voting to avoid investor scrutiny of their undeserved 
compensation.  
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With respect to the exemptions in accounting and auditing, the evidence from other 
proxies for compliance costs and investor protection also suggests that managers act in the best 
interests of investors. For example, the coefficient on RDINT is consistently negative in the 
DELAY election, with chi-square statistics ranging from 2.78 to 2.91. The evidence indicates 
that firms with more R&D, and thus, greater proprietary costs are less likely to opt out of (more 
likely to elect) the option to delay adopting new accounting standards. The proposed new 
accounting standards during the five years after the enactment of the Act (2012–17) relate mostly 
to R&D–intensive firms (such as the amended consolidation analysis for R&D arrangements in 
Accounting Standards Update 2015-02). The evidence suggests that managers act in the best 
interests of investors by delaying the adoption of these new accounting standards and hence 
delaying the revelation of the firms’ proprietary information. Furthermore, the positive 
coefficient on SALES in the AUDATT and PCAOB elections indicates that smaller firms are 
less likely to opt out of (more likely to elect) these two exemptions. This is consistent with 
managers in smaller firms acting in the best interests of investors to lower the compliance burden 
of SOX section 404 and PCAOB requirements, which disproportionately affect smaller firms 
(e.g., A.R.C. Morgan [2005]). In addition, the coefficient on ROA is consistently positive in the 
AUDATT election with chi-square ranging from 2.73 to 2.95, indicating that less profitable firms 
are less likely to opt out of (more likely to elect) the exemption from the auditor attestation 
requirement of section 404 of SOX. Less profitable firms have limited resources and managers in 
those firms may be more willing to use their limited resources for company building instead of 
for satisfying reporting and compliance requirements.  
With respect to the exemptions in executive compensation disclosure and voting, the 
evidence is largely consistent with highly paid managers using the two exemptions in REDDIS 
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and VOTE to avoid investor scrutiny and to enhance their private benefit. For instance, firms 
with higher CEOPAY and firms with higher incentive pay for CEOs and CFOs combined are 
less likely to opt out of (more likely to elect) the two exemptions. Furthermore, the coefficient on 
sales growth (SALEG) is consistently positive with chi-square ranging from 2.76 to 3.17, which 
suggests that fast-growing firms are more likely to outgrow EGC eligibility and opt out of these 
two elections.  
In summary, the results in table 5 show that managers in retro-activated EGCs utilize the 
à la carte elements in the Act in a contextual manner. We find evidence consistent with managers 
electing some exemptions (e.g., DELAY, AUDATT, and PCAOB) in the best interests of the 
investors. On the other hand, we also observe evidence suggesting that managers elect other 
exemptions (e.g., REDDIS and VOTE) to enhance their private benefit.  
 
4.3 The enactment window return and subsequent elections of exemptions  
Section 4.1 discusses investors’ overall perception of the whole package of à la carte 
elements in the post-IPO provisions under the Act. We next analyze investors’ perception of 
each of the à la carte elements separately under the premise that investors rationally anticipate 
the firm-level election of each exemption at the enactment of the Act based on their assessment 
of the costs and benefits associated with the particular exemption for a given firm (i.e., local 
optimization on a firm-by-firm basis). Accordingly, we use the actual election of each exemption 
as the proxy for investors’ expected election of each exemption for a given firm. Table 6 reports 
the regression of ARETAPR5 on actual exemption elections and control variables. The sample is 
restricted to the EGC-eligible sample. We adjust the t-statistics for cluster-robust standard errors 
(two-way cluster by both firm and year).  
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As shown in the first column of table 6, none of the control variables can explain the 
cross-sectional variation in retro-activated EGCs’ stock returns at the enactment of the Act. In 
the second column, we include both the control variables and actual election variables. The 
coefficients on DELAY and AUDATT are -0.043 (t = -2.17) and -0.020 (t = -2.04) respectively, 
indicating that retro-activated EGCs’ enactment window returns are lower when they opt out of 
DELAY and AUDATT exemptions in future years. The two negative coefficients suggest that 
investors perceive the elections of the two exemptions positively. The coefficient on PCAOB is 
0.054 (t = 2.50), indicating that retro-activated EGCs’ enactment window returns are higher 
when the firms opt out of the PCAOB exemption. This suggests that, at the enactment of the Act, 
investors anticipate that the potential costs of electing the PCAOB exemption exceed the 
associated benefits. The coefficients on both REDDIS and VOTE are not significant statistically. 
The two insignificant coefficients suggest that investors anticipate that electing the two 
exemptions does not result in significant net benefits, or the actual elections of REDDIS and 
VOTE are noisy proxies for expected elections of the two exemptions, or both. Furthermore, the 
coefficient on SALEG is -0.016 (t = -4.89), confirming the finding in table 2 that investors 
anticipate that fast-growing EGCs benefit less from the exemptions because these firms will soon 
outgrow the EGC eligibility threshold.  
 
4.4 Costs and benefits of individual exemptions  
In section 4.1, we analyze investors’ overall perception of the net benefits of the Act’s 
post-IPO provisions and the direct savings in audit fees from the whole package. In this section, 
we examine the costs and benefits of each individual exemption. Table 7 reports regressions of 
annual SG&A expenses and audit fees on the exemption elections and control variables for the 
EGC-eligible sample. We adjust the t-statistics for cluster-robust standard errors (two-way 
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cluster by firm and year). In the first column, the dependent variable is SG&A. The coefficients 
are 0.259 (t = 3.80) on DELAY, 0.127 (t = 2.47) on AUDATT, and 0.388 (t = 3.16) on PCAOB. 
These positive coefficients suggest that SG&A expenses are higher when EGCs opt out of these 
exemptions. In the second column, when the dependent variable is audit fees, the coefficients on 
DELAY and AUDATT continue to be positive. However, the coefficient on PCAOB is not 
statistically significant, suggesting the cost savings of the PCAOB exemption come from costs 
other than audit fees (e.g., search costs for new audit firms).
12
 Overall, the results in table 7 show 
that certain exemptions, especially DELAY and AUDATT, provide cost savings in direct 
compliance costs to retro-activated EGCs, which corroborates the findings in table 3.  
The shift from prix fixe mandates to the regulatory framework with à la carte elements 
can potentially lead to a loss of information or a loss of commitment to more stringent standards, 
or both. It is empirically challenging to separate these two effects in our setting. If we are to 
mimic the research design in Cheng et al. [2013], we need to measure the change in market 
illiquidity for those retro-activated EGCs that choose to maintain the disclosure level before and 
after the enactment of the Act. However, because the retro-activated EGCs are all new IPO 
firms, the period before the enactment of the Act is not long enough to have their first post-IPO 
10-Ks and proxy statements reported under prix fixe mandates. Consequently, we attempt to 
assess those potential costs by examining if there is any noticeable decrease in market illiquidity 
as EGCs exit the exemptions. The increase in information and the enhancement in commitment 
to more stringent standards can potentially coexist as EGCs return to the prix fixe mandates. 
                                                 
12
 The cost savings of the PCAOB exemption evidenced by the positive coefficient in the SG&A regression in table 
7 seem to be inconsistent with the negative net benefit assessed by investors on this exemption at the enactment of 
the Act (as shown by the positive coefficient on PCAOB in table 6). However, the analysis in Table 7 is limited to 
SG&A expenses, which may not capture the full scope of the net benefit of the exemption. Furthermore, all 
coefficients on the election of the PCAOB exemption need to be interpreted with the caveat that only a very small 
number of retro-activated EGCs elected this exemption, and therefore, the coefficients could be driven by 
idiosyncratic characteristics of the few firms that did so.  
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Both effects reduce market illiquidity. Following Cheng et al. [2013], we use effective bid-ask 
spreads (SPRD) and the Amihud [2002] illiquidity ratio (AMILL) as the proxies for illiquidity 
and control for trading volume (VOL), price (PRC), market cap (MCAP), and return volatility 
(RETVOL).  
Panel A of table 8 reports the summary statistics in the year when EGC status expires and 
the year before EGC status expires. There is no significant change in SPRD when EGC status 
expires. In contrast, AMILL decreases significantly when EGC status expires, from 0.497 to 
0.432, with the difference significant at the 1% level (t = -3.93). However, the expiration of EGC 
status also coincides with the overall increase in market capitalization of retro-activated EGCs 
over time, which may lead to improvements in liquidity in the capital market. Supporting this 
argument, we observe a significant increase in VOL (t = 2.03), PRC (t = 4.72), and MCAP (t = 
4.21). To formally test whether the expiration of EGC status and the return to prix fixe regulation 
reduces illiquidity, we regress SPRD and AMILL on the control variables and the indicator 
variable EGCEXP, which is set to one for the year in which EGC status expires and zero 
otherwise.
13
 As shown in panel B of table 8, the coefficient on EGCEXP is not statistically 
significant for both specifications. The evidence indicates that after controlling for the overall 
improvement in market liquidity of retro-activated EGCs, the expiration of EGC status does not 
reduce illiquidity.  
As shown in panel B of table 4, many EGCs opt out of the exemptions while they are still 
eligible for EGC status. This means that the change in disclosure practices and the return to prix 
fixe mandates happen when retro-activated EGCs opt out of a particular exemption rather than 
when EGC status expires. Accordingly, we examine the change in illiquidity around the opt-out 
of each exemption. For brevity, we report only the coefficients on the election variables in panel 
                                                 
13
 Following Cheng et al. [2013], we use log transformation of the variables in regression analyses.  
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C of table 8. Only the coefficient on DELAY is statistically significant in the LogSPRD 
regression. The slope coefficient is -0.421 (t = -2.16), indicating that when EGCs opt out of the 
option to delay adopting new accounting standards, there is a decrease in effective bid-ask 
spreads. The evidence lends some support to the argument that when EGCs delay adopting new 
and revised accounting standards, their financial statements may not be comparable to those of 
other firms and hence may create some information friction in the capital market. However, 
when AMILL is the illiquidity measure, none of the coefficients on the election variables are 
statistically significant. In summary, the results in table 8 show no significant change in 
illiquidity around the expiration of EGC status or at the opt-out of an individual exemption. 
 
V. Conclusion 
This study examines the cross-sectional variation in investors’ perception of and 
managers’ response to a structural change in the regulatory framework that provides voluntary 
choices within the mandatory framework. We find that, relative to the control group, retro-
activated EGCs report higher short-window market returns upon the enactment of the Act. Retro-
activated EGCs’ enactment window return is lower when sales and sales growth rate are higher, 
both of which indicate a shorter expected duration for EGC status. The empirical findings are 
consistent with the theory that relative to prix fixe mandates, the à la carte elements in regulation 
shift the tradeoff between compliance costs and investor protection from the regulator to the 
regulated firm, which enables local optimization on a firm-by-firm basis. Furthermore, we find 
empirical evidence that managers react in both investors’ interests and for their private benefit 
when utilizing the à la carte elements in post-IPO years. In summary, the evidence suggests that 
investors perceive that the benefits from local optimization associated with à la carte elements in 
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regulation exceed the potential costs from managerial opportunism and the loss of information or 
commitment.   
The different information environments that SRCs and retro-activated EGCs face could 
partially explain the different results on illiquidity in response to “mandatory-to-voluntary” 
regime shifts for retro-activated EGCs versus SRCs in Cheng et al. [2013]. Future studies could 
investigate this issue further and systematically examine the economic effects of regulatory 
changes in the context of information environment.  
  
35 
 
Appendix I Variable definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
JOBS Act exemption election variables 
AUDATT An indicator variable that equals one when a firm stops the election of the 
exemption to comply with auditor attestation requirements of section 404 of 
SOX, and zero if the firm continues to elect it 
DELAY An indicator variable that equals one when a firm stops the election of delaying 
adoption of certain accounting standards, and zero if the firm continues to elect 
it 
PCAOB An indicator variable that equals one when a firm stops the election of the 
exemption to comply with any requirement that may be adopted by the 
PCAOB, and zero if the firm continues to elect it 
REDDIS An indicator variable that equals one when a firm stops the election of reduced 
disclosure obligations regarding executive compensation, and zero if the firm 
continues to elect it 
VOTE An indicator variable that equals one when a firm stops the election of the 
exemption from the requirements of holding a non-binding advisory vote on 
executive compensation and stockholder approval of any golden parachute 
payments, and zero if the firm continues to elect it 
Variables used in the tests of JOBS Act enactment announcement returns 
ARETAPR5 
 
The three-day cumulative size and book-to-market adjusted stock returns 
starting on April 5, 2012. We follow Dharan and Ikenberry [1995] in adjusting 
returns for book-to-market and size. ARETAPR5 for each firm is measured as the 
buy-hold return over the three-day period starting April 5, 2012, in excess of 
the buy-hold return on its size and book-to-market matched portfolio over the 
same period. 
BTM Book-to-market ratio 
MCAP Market capitalization 
RETRO  An indicator variable that equals one for the 48 retro-activated EGCs and zero 
for the 97 control IPOs 
SALES Sales measured in $ billion 
SALEG Sales growth rate from year t-1 to year t, SALEt/SALEt-1 - 1 
SIZE Natural log of market capitalization 
SRC An indicator variable that equals one for SRCs and zero otherwise 
Variables used in the tests over the five years after IPO 
DUALCLASS An indicator variable that equals one for firms with dual-class shares and zero 
otherwise 
RDINT R&D intensity, measured as R&D expenses divided by sales 
ROA Income before extraordinary items divided by total assets 
SEGMENT Number of segments 
CEOPAY The natural log of one plus CEO’s total compensation, including salary, 
incentive compensation (e.g., bonus, stock awards, option awards, and non-
equity incentive plan compensation), and other compensation 
CFOPAY The natural log of one plus CFO’s total compensation, including salary, 
36 
 
incentive compensation (e.g., bonus, stock awards, option awards, and non-
equity incentive plan compensation), and other compensation 
SALARY The natural log of one plus CEO and CFO’s combined salary 
INCENTIVE The natural log of one plus CEO and CFO’s combined incentive compensation 
(e.g., bonus, stock awards, option awards, and non-equity incentive plan 
compensation) 
OTHERCOMP The natural log of one plus CEO and CFO’s combined other compensation 
EGCEXP An indicator variable that equals one if a firm’s EGC status expires and zero 
otherwise 
SG&A Selling, general, and administrative expenses divided by total assets 
AUDITFEE Audit fees divided by total assets 
NAUDITFEE Non-audit fees divided by total assets 
TOTALFEE The sum of audit and non-audit fees divided by total assets 
TA Total assets in $ million 
SPRD 
(LogSPRD) 
Annual average of daily effective bid-ask spreads, where daily effective bid-ask 
spreads are calculated as (ask - bid) / [(ask + bid)/2]. LogSPRD is the natural 
log of SPRD 
AMILL 
(LogAMILL) 
Annual average of the Amihud [2002] illiquidity ratio, calculated as the daily 
absolute return to the (dollar) trading volume. We standardize AMILL 
separately for stocks traded on the NYSE or AMEX versus those traded on 
NASDAQ to account for the different market microstructures (Atkins and Dyl 
[1997]). We sort on AMILL within each year (separately for NYSE/AMEX and 
NASDAQ stocks) and assign percentile ranks to each observation, ranging from 
0 (low AMILL) to 99 (high AMILL). We then standardize the percentiles by 
dividing them by 99. LogAMILL is the natural log of AMILL 
VOL 
(LogVOL) 
Annual average of daily trading volume, calculated as total trading volume 
scaled by shares outstanding. We standardize VOL in the same way as AMILL. 
LogVOL is the natural log of VOL 
PRC 
(LogPRC) 
Annual average of daily closing price. LogPRC is the natural log of PRC 
MCAP 
(LogMCAP) 
Annual average of daily market capitalization. LogMCAP is the natural log of 
MCAP 
RETVOL 
(LogRETVOL) 
Annualized standard deviation of daily return. LogRETVOL is the natural log 
of RETVOL 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics at IPO of the retro-activated EGCs and the control firms 
 
Panel A Summary statistics of the retro-activated EGCs and the control firms 
 
Variable 
EGCs (n=48) Controls (n=97) Difference 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
SRC 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.00 -0.03 0.00 
  
 
      (-0.66) (0.62) 
SALES 0.17 0.09 0.16 0.08 0.01 0.01 
  
 
      (0.30) (0.49) 
SALEG 1.07 0.39 1.35 0.32 -0.28 0.07 
  
 
      (-0.46) (0.46) 
BTM 0.24 0.10 0.75 0.37 -0.51*** -0.27*** 
  
 
      (-3.22) (-4.35) 
SIZE 6.17 6.24 5.87 5.99 0.30 0.25 
  
 
      (1.44) (1.05) 
MCAP 851.56 515.30 802.63 399.91 48.93 115.39 
  
 
      (0.21) (1.05) 
ARETAPR5 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03*** 0.01*** 
          (3.25) (2.67) 
 
Panel B Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman (below diagonal) correlations 
 
  RETRO SRC SALES SALEG BTM SIZE ARETAPR5 
RETRO 
 
-0.06 0.02 -0.04 -0.22 0.11 0.27 
SRC -0.06 
 
-0.18 -0.09 0.11 -0.55 -0.25 
SALES 0.05 -0.29 
 
-0.09 -0.05 0.38 0.04 
SALEG 0.03 -0.29 -0.13 
 
-0.05 0.07 -0.14 
BTM -0.36 0.08 -0.05 -0.12 
 
-0.43 0.06 
SIZE 0.09 -0.44 0.50 0.10 -0.39 
 
0.11 
ARETAPR5 0.24 -0.18 0.17 -0.19 -0.06 0.04 
  
The sample includes 48 IPOs completed between December 8, 2011, and April 5, 2012, that are eligible for EGC 
status under the Act, and 97 IPOs completed between January 1 and December 8, 2011, as control firms. See 
appendix I for variable definitions. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 in panel A denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. The bold numbers in panel B indicate statistical significance of at least 
10%.  
41 
 
Table 2 Regressions of three-day enactment window return on characteristics at IPO 
 
  Dependent variable: ARETAPR5 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
INTERCEPT -0.062 -0.066 -0.056 -0.060 
 
(-1.50) (-1.61) (-1.29) (-1.41) 
RETRO 0.034*** 0.052*** 0.032*** 0.050*** 
 
(3.78) (4.31) (3.16) (3.73) 
SRC -0.047*** -0.046** -0.057*** -0.057*** 
 
(-2.61) (-2.57) (-2.76) (-2.78) 
BTM 0.012** 0.014*** 0.011** 0.013*** 
 
(2.44) (2.88) (2.33) (2.77) 
SIZE 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.005 
 
(0.74) (1.06) (0.56) (0.97) 
SALES 
 
0.009 
 
0.000 
 
 
(0.30) 
 
(-0.02) 
RETRO*SALES 
 
-0.100** 
 
-0.099** 
 
 
(-2.18) 
 
(-2.09) 
SALEG 
  
-0.003* -0.003* 
 
  
(-1.76) (-1.93) 
RETRO*SALEG 
  
0.001 0.001 
 
  
(0.32) (0.48) 
Industry fixed effect YES YES YES YES 
Adjusted R-square 15.3% 17.8% 16.3% 19.4% 
No. of Observations 145 145 132 132 
 
This table reports the OLS regression results of equation (1). The sample includes 48 IPOs completed between 
December 8, 2011, and April 5, 2012, that are eligible for EGC status under the Act, and 97 IPOs completed 
between January 1 and December 8, 2011, as control firms. See appendix I for variable definitions. Industries are 
defined using Fama-French 12 industry classifications. The numbers in the parentheses are t-statistic. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 
denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 3 Comparison of SG&A and audit fees between retro-activated EGCs and control 
firms 
 
  Retro-activated Control Difference 
SG&A 25.43% 24.82% 0.61% 
   
(0.23) 
AUDITFEE 0.32% 0.42% -0.11%* 
   
(-1.69) 
NAUDITFEE 0.05% 0.07% -0.02% 
   
(-1.35) 
TOTALFEE 0.37% 0.49% -0.13%* 
   
(-1.81) 
TA 1,379 1,088 291 
      (1.50) 
 
The table reports average annual selling, general, and administrative expenses (SG&A), audit fees (AUDITFEE), 
non-audit fees (NAUDITFEE), total fees (TOTALFEE), and total assets (TA) of all firm-year observations over the 
five years after IPO for the 48 retro-activated EGCs and the 97 control IPOs. See appendix I for variable definitions. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics of the 48 retro-activated EGCs over the five years after IPO 
 
Panel A Transition matrix of 48 retro-activated EGCs 
 
  1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 
EGC 44 92% 34 71% 22 46% 15 31% 14 29% 
Non-EGC 4 8% 13 27% 23 48% 27 56% 25 52% 
Delisted/Acquired 0 0% 1 2% 3 6% 6 13% 9 19% 
Total 48 100% 48 100% 48 100% 48 100% 48 100% 
 
Panel B Summary statistics of the retro-activated EGCs over the five years after IPO 
 
Variable 
All firm-year sample EGC-eligible sample 
N Mean Median N Mean Median 
DELAY 221 0.91 1.00 129 0.84 1.00 
AUDATT 221 0.53 1.00 129 0.20 0.00 
PCAOB 221 0.97 1.00 129 0.95 1.00 
REDDIS 221 0.87 1.00 129 0.78 1.00 
VOTE 221 0.92 1.00 129 0.86 1.00 
SALES 221 0.52 0.23 129 0.18 0.12 
RDINT 221 0.33 0.00 129 0.42 0.01 
SEGMENT 221 1.41 1.00 129 1.29 1.00 
ROA 221 -0.11 0.00 129 -0.15 -0.04 
DUALCLASS 221 0.14 0.00 129 0.06 0.00 
SALEG 219 0.36 0.20 127 0.34 0.16 
CEOPAY 221 13.91 14.35 129 13.69 14.16 
CFOPAY 221 13.09 13.70 129 12.58 13.41 
SALARY 221 12.81 13.47 129 12.74 13.36 
INCENTIVE 221 13.85 14.51 129 13.54 14.31 
OTHERCOMP 221 9.17 10.49 129 8.32 9.89 
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
Panel C Pearson (above diagonal) and Spearman (below diagonal) correlations of the EGC eligible sample 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
DELAY (1)  0.22 -0.07 -0.23 -0.17 0.21 -0.51 0.17 0.34 0.11 -0.07 -0.12 0.03 -0.11 -0.11 -0.09 
AUDATT (2) 0.22  0.08 0.09 -0.02 0.15 -0.16 0.06 0.11 0.35 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.14 
PCAOB (3) -0.07 0.08  -0.08 -0.06 0.14 -0.34 0.06 0.14 0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.11 
REDDIS (4) -0.23 0.09 -0.08  0.64 -0.26 0.15 -0.18 -0.20 0.14 0.01 0.29 0.10 0.32 0.21 0.03 
VOTE (5) -0.17 -0.02 -0.06 0.64  -0.40 0.12 -0.29 -0.13 0.10 -0.01 -0.05 -0.09 0.12 -0.07 -0.04 
SALES (6) 0.31 0.18 0.20 -0.35 -0.43  -0.26 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.21 0.14 0.17 0.08 0.16 0.22 
RDINT (7) -0.23 -0.18 -0.13 0.08 0.12 -0.08  -0.13 -0.45 -0.08 -0.18 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.05 
SEGMENT (8) 0.20 0.15 0.07 -0.22 -0.33 0.28 -0.19  0.15 -0.06 -0.03 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.18 
ROA (9) 0.28 0.09 0.20 -0.24 -0.16 0.53 -0.44 0.17  0.14 0.22 -0.12 0.10 -0.15 -0.07 -0.09 
DUALCLASS (10) 0.11 0.35 0.04 0.14 0.10 0.24 -0.16 -0.04 0.22  0.14 -0.11 0.00 -0.11 -0.17 0.03 
SALEG (11) 0.21 0.18 -0.02 -0.05 -0.12 0.36 -0.21 0.04 0.52 0.27  -0.02 0.09 -0.06 -0.03 0.07 
CEOPAY (12) -0.16 -0.07 -0.02 0.18 -0.02 0.15 0.23 0.05 -0.23 -0.12 -0.10  0.56 0.82 0.86 0.32 
CFOPAY (13) -0.13 -0.07 0.02 0.12 -0.01 0.20 0.29 0.01 -0.02 -0.11 0.12 0.59  0.52 0.50 0.14 
SALARY (14) -0.24 -0.04 -0.10 -0.03 -0.09 0.08 0.27 0.14 -0.27 -0.29 -0.31 0.46 0.49  0.65 0.28 
INCENTIVE (15) -0.15 -0.07 0.00 0.21 0.02 0.17 0.25 0.01 -0.17 -0.08 0.01 0.94 0.74 0.37  0.24 
OTHERCOMP (16) 0.08 0.12 -0.15 -0.01 -0.01 0.20 -0.30 0.22 0.17 0.02 0.07 0.04 -0.03 0.22 -0.04   
 
The all firm-year sample includes 221 firm-year observations over the five years after IPO of the 48 IPOs completed between December 8, 2011, and April 5, 
2012, that are eligible for EGC status under the Act. The EGC-eligible sample includes 129 firm-year observations when these 48 firms were eligible for EGC 
status. Panel A reports the transition of 48 retro-activated EGCs during the five years after IPO. Panel B and panel C report the summary statistics and 
correlations of the exemption elections and control variables, respectively. See appendix I for variable definitions. The bold-face numbers in panel C indicate 
statistical significance of at least 10%. 
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Table 5 Hazard model of the exemption elections 
 
 
DELAY AUDATT PCAOB REDDIS VOTE 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
SALES -0.244 0.307 0.236 1.610*** 1.661*** 1.708*** 0.744 1.255* 1.368* -0.215 -0.344 -0.328 -0.300 0.105 0.039 
 
(0.12) (0.17) (0.09) (13.22) (12.97) (12.61) (0.90) (2.80) (2.87) (0.10) (0.25) (0.22) (0.21) (0.02) (0.00) 
RDINT -0.822* -0.915* -0.823* 0.030 -0.091 0.036 -0.029 0.072 -0.003 0.171 0.187 0.171 0.144 0.367* 0.155 
 
(2.82) (2.78) (2.91) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) (0.02) (0.10) (0.00) (0.99) (0.84) (0.97) (0.74) (3.09) (0.85) 
SEGMENT 0.001 0.027 0.088 0.116 0.141 0.164 -0.225 -0.208 -0.211 -0.147 -0.182 -0.162 -0.398 -0.359 -0.373 
 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.17) (0.22) (0.32) (0.41) (1.07) (0.90) (0.86) (0.32) (0.46) (0.36) (2.01) (1.75) (1.75) 
ROA -0.047 -0.250 -0.125 2.804* 2.614* 2.616* -0.959 -1.379 -1.306 0.101 0.400 0.166 0.341 0.001 -0.230 
 
(0.00) (0.05) (0.01) (2.95) (2.94) (2.73) (0.50) (1.10) (0.94) (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) (0.06) (0.00) (0.03) 
DUALCLASS 1.640*** 1.453*** 1.480* 3.780*** 3.620*** 3.703*** 0.977* 0.725* 0.805* 2.185*** 2.371*** 2.419*** 1.791*** 1.348** 1.103* 
 
(9.12) (7.09) (3.32) (26.29) (21.98) (23.25) (3.34) (2.74) (3.23) (14.01) (14.69) (10.14) (10.13) (5.10) (3.30) 
SALEG -0.086 -0.058 -0.070 0.207 0.223 0.179 -0.164 -0.114 -0.166 0.816* 0.858* 0.858* 0.618* 0.774* 0.567* 
 
(0.17) (0.07) (0.11) (1.27) (1.41) (0.85) (0.14) (0.06) (0.14) (2.87) (3.17) (3.00) (2.79) (2.77) (2.76) 
CEOPAY 
 
-0.179** 
  
-0.225* 
  
-0.136* 
  
-0.126* 
  
-0.140* 
 
  
(5.88) 
  
(3.01) 
  
(3.81) 
  
(2.82) 
  
(2.89) 
 CFOPAY 
 
0.015 
  
-0.201 
  
-0.040 
  
-0.021 
  
-0.097 
 
  
(0.06) 
  
(0.77) 
  
(0.40) 
  
(0.08) 
  
(2.05) 
 SALARY 
  
-0.067 
  
-0.096* 
  
-0.088* 
  
0.001 
  
-0.026 
   
(1.07) 
  
(2.84) 
  
(2.74) 
  
(0.00) 
  
(0.19) 
INCENTIVE 
  
-0.024 
  
-0.001 
  
-0.023 
  
-0.073* 
  
-0.082* 
   
(0.18) 
  
(0.00) 
  
(0.20) 
  
(2.99) 
  
(2.88) 
OTHERCOMP 
  
-0.079* 
  
0.032 
  
-0.060 
  
0.005 
  
-0.043 
   
(3.05) 
  
(0.35) 
  
(1.64) 
  
(0.01) 
  
(0.76) 
Industry fixed 
effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 63 136 51 70 60 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
The sample starts with the 221 firm-year observations over the five years after IPO of the 48 IPOs completed between December 8, 2011, and April 5, 2012, that 
are eligible for EGC status under the Act. We track the election status for each exemption for each firm until the firm no longer elects that particular exemption 
or is no longer eligible for EGC status. Hence, the number of observations varies across each election. The table reports the Cox proportional hazard model of 
stopping an exemption as shown in equation 2. See appendix I for variable definitions. Industries are defined using Fama-French 12 industry classifications. The 
numbers in the parentheses are chi-square statistics. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 6 Enactment window return and future exemption elections 
 
  Dependent variable: ARETAPR5 
INTERCEPT -0.007 0.005 
 
(-0.59) (0.22) 
SRC -0.007 -0.006 
 
(-0.32) (-0.32) 
BTM 0.004 0.007 
 
(0.56) (0.99) 
SIZE 0.011 0.011* 
 
(1.46) (2.02) 
SALES 0.027 0.031 
 
(1.23) (1.25) 
SALEG -0.015 -0.016*** 
 
(-1.74) (-4.89) 
DELAY 
 
-0.043* 
 
 
(-2.17) 
AUDATT 
 
-0.020* 
 
 
(-2.04) 
PCAOB 
 
0.054* 
 
 
(2.50) 
REDDIS 
 
-0.016 
 
 
(-1.00) 
VOTE 
 
-0.006 
 
 
(-0.57) 
Industry fixed effect YES YES 
Adjusted R-square 30.1% 48.8% 
No. of Observations 126 126 
 
The sample starts with the 221 firm-year observations over the five years after IPO of the 48 IPOs completed 
between December 8, 2011, and April 5, 2012, that are eligible for EGC status under the Act. We exclude firm-year 
observations where the retro-activated EGCs no longer qualify for EGC status. The table reports regression of three-
day enactment window return starting on April 5, 2012, on the elections of the exemptions over the five years after 
IPO. See appendix I for variable definitions. Industries are defined using Fama-French 12 industry classifications. 
The numbers in the parentheses are t-statistic adjusted for two-way cluster-robust standard errors (clustered by firm 
and year). 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed 
test. 
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Table 7 Effects of individual exemptions on SG&A and audit fees 
 
  SG&A AUDITFEE 
INTERCEPT 0.167 0.031** 
 
(1.80) (3.22) 
SRC 0.166 0.006 
 
(1.19) (1.29) 
BTM -0.076 -0.004** 
 
(-1.48) (-3.07) 
SIZE -0.065** -0.003** 
 
(-3.46) (-2.89) 
SEGMENT -0.036 0.001 
 
(-0.77) (0.76) 
SALES -0.077 0.000 
 
(-0.88) (0.06) 
SALEG 0.044** 0.001* 
 
(2.88) (2.40) 
DELAY 0.259** 0.007* 
 
(3.80) (2.20) 
AUDATT 0.127* 0.003* 
 
(2.47) (2.15) 
PCAOB 0.388** 0.001 
 
(3.16) (0.36) 
REDDIS 0.009 0.001 
 
(0.26) (0.41) 
VOTE -0.054 -0.002 
 
(-0.94) (-0.70) 
Industry fixed effect YES YES 
Adjusted R-square 71.9% 44.7% 
No. of Observations 116 106 
 
The sample starts with the 221 firm-year observations over the five years after IPO of the 48 IPOs completed 
between December 8, 2011, and April 5, 2012, that are eligible for EGC status under the Act. We exclude firm-year 
observations where the retro-activated EGCs no longer qualify for EGC status. The table reports regressions of 
selling, general, and administrative expenses (SG&A) and audit fees (AUDITFEE) on the elections of the 
exemptions over the five years after IPO. See appendix I for variable definitions. Industries are defined using Fama-
French 12 industry classifications. The numbers in the parentheses are t-statistic adjusted for two-way cluster-robust 
standard errors (clustered by firm and year). 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 denote statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 8 Change in illiquidity for EGCs at the expiration of EGC status and at the opt-out 
of an individual exemption  
 
Panel A Summary statistics at the expiration of EGC status 
 
  Year EGC expires Year before EGC expires Difference 
SPRD 0.005 0.004 0.001 
   
(1.01) 
AMILL 0.432 0.497 -0.065*** 
   
(-3.93) 
VOL 0.668 0.588 0.080** 
   
(2.03) 
PRC 22.449 15.766 6.683*** 
   
(4.72) 
MCAP 1,131 698 433*** 
   
(4.21) 
RETVOL 0.554 0.532 0.022 
      (0.70) 
No. of 
Observations 44 44 
 
 
Panel B Change in illiquidity for EGCs at the expiration of EGC status 
 
  LogSPRD LogAMILL 
Intercept -0.785 1.443*** 
 
(-1.48) (19.82) 
EGCEXP 0.021 -0.012 
 
(0.17) (-0.75) 
LogVOL -1.947*** -0.462*** 
 
(-5.67) (-9.79) 
LogPRC -0.236** 0.027* 
 
(-2.14) (1.76) 
LogMCAP -0.526*** -0.098*** 
 
(-5.95) (-8.04) 
LogRETVOL 0.289 0.187*** 
 
(1.22) (5.75) 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-square 80.7% 86.0% 
No. of Observations 88 88 
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Table 8 (continued) 
 
Panel C Change in illiquidity for EGCs at the opt-out of individual exemptions  
 
  DELAY AUDATT PCAOB REDDIS VOTE 
Control 
variables 
Industry 
fixed effects 
LogSPRD 
-0.421*         
Included Included 
(-2.16) 
    
 
-0.082 
   
Included Included 
 
(-0.65) 
   
  
-0.352 
  
Included Included 
  
(-0.85) 
  
   
-0.067 
 
Included Included 
   
(-0.30) 
 
    
-0.185 
Included Included 
        (-0.96) 
LogAMILL 
-0.037         
Included Included 
(-1.11) 
    
 
-0.004 
   
Included Included 
 
(-0.25) 
   
  
0.083 
  
Included Included 
  
(1.34) 
  
   
-0.033 
 
Included Included 
   
(-1.09) 
 
    
0.001 
Included Included 
        (0.04) 
 
We track the expiration of EGC status and the stop of elections of exemptions for the 48 IPOs completed between 
December 8, 2011, and April 5, 2012, that are eligible for EGC status under the Act. We then measure the annual 
average illiquidity measures in the year before EGC expires (election stops) and in the year when EGC expires 
(election stops). See appendix I for variable definitions. Industries are defined using Fama-French 12 industry 
classifications. The numbers in the parentheses are t-statistic. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 denote statistical significance at 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
 
